Privacy Statement

Contact Tracing App – Belgium

Version 1.2 14 April 2022

The precise operation of Coronalert and the underlying databases, and the responsibilities in that respect, are regulated by  Cooperation agreement of 25 August 2020 between the Federal State, the Flemish Community, the Walloon Region, the German-speaking Community and the Joint Community Commission, concerning the joint processing of data by Sciensano and the contact centres, health inspections and mobile teams designated by the competent federated entities or by the competent agencies within the framework of a contact investigation of persons (presumed) to be infected with the coronavirus COVID-19 on the basis of a database at Sciensano.

This cooperation agreement regulates the databases used, in particular Article 14. For the sake of readability, this text systematically refers to Sciensano as the person responsible for processing the databases. This is without prejudice to the fact that the regulations referred to assign certain responsibilities in respect of the app itself to the federated entities.

 

1. Introduction to the contact tracing app

This Contact Tracing App was developed in the context of the Coronavirus outbreak and pursuant to an initiative from the Belgian Government and federated entities.

The Contact Tracing App is based on a proximity tracing system called “Decentralized Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing” (“DP-3T system”) developed by an international consortium of technologists, legal experts, engineers and epidemiologists from various universities. More detailed information about the DP-3T system is publicly available at https://github.com/DP-3T/documents. In addition, the Contact Tracing App uses the Exposure Notification System created by Google and Apple. This Exposure Notification System allows the Contact Tracing App to send notifications to the user as further explained below. More information on the Exposure Notification System is available at https://www.google.com/covid19/exposurenotifications/.

The use of the Contact Tracing App is completely voluntary. In other words, there is no obligation whatsoever to install this Contact Tracing App.

The Contact Tracing App is intended to be used in any country that also uses a DP-3T system. This means that if a user of the Belgian Contact Tracing App visits such a country, s/he can also receive notifications that s/he has been at risk in such a country.

 

2. Who is the controller for the contact tracing app?

This Contact Tracing App is regulated by the Samenwerkingsakkoord van 25 augustus 2020 tussen de Federale staat, de Vlaamse Gemeenschap, het Waalse Gewest, de Duitstalige Gemeenschap en de Gemeenschappelijke Gemeenschapscommissie, betreffende de gezamenlijke gegevensverwerking door Sciensano en de door de bevoegde gefedereerde entiteiten of door de bevoegde agentschappen aangeduide contactcentra, gezondheidsinspecties en mobiele teams in het kader van een contactonderzoek bij personen die (vermoedelijk) met het coronavirus COVID-19 besmet zijn op basis van een gegevensbank bij Sciensano(herinafter referred to as “Cooperation agreement of 25 August 2020”).

This Contact Tracing App is offered by the regional health administrations and Sciensano is responsible for the server infrastructure of the app.  Sciensano is a public institution with legal personality established by the Act of 25 February 2018 regarding the establishment of Sciensano, with registered office at rue Juliette Wytsman 14, B-1050 Ixelles and registered with the Crossroads Bank for Enterprises under the number 0693.876.830 (hereinafter referred to as “Sciensano”).

According to theCooperation Agreement of 25 August 2020, Sciensano acts as data controller with regard to the collection and processing of personal data within the meaning of the General Data Protection Regulation (hereinafter referred to as “GDPR”).

Sciensano can be contacted via mail at the address stated above and by email at [email protected].

 

It has appointed a Data Protection Officer who can be contacted at [email protected].

 

3. What is the purpose of the contact tracing app and how does it work?

Proximity tracing

The purpose of the Contact Tracing App is to inform citizens who have been in close physical proximity to a COVID-19 positive person and thus exposed to the virus, without revealing the contact’s identity or where and when the contact occurred. The various processing of personal data performed in the framework of this notification process and in the framework of the registration as user of the Contact Tracing App are based on grounds of public interest (art. 6.1 (e) GDPR) and, as far as data relating to health are concerned, grounds of public interest in the area of public health (9.2 (i) GDPR). The Contact Tracing App is regulated by the Cooperation Agreement of 25 August 2020. Processing activities are indeed carried out in the public interest as they aim at containing the spread of COVID-19 and protecting the population against this epidemic.

To achieve this goal the Contact Tracing App generates secret keys and computes from these keys ephemeral (in other words, temporary), random ID which represent the user’s phone. These IDs are ephemeral because they refresh at a high frequency (every 10-20 minutes), i.e. at the same frequency as the Bluetooth MAC address (i.e. the temporary identifiers that Bluetooth devices use to indicate the originator or recipient of messages).

The user’s phone broadcasts these random IDs and also records the random IDs observed from other phones that are nearby and stores these for 14 days together with the date, the signal strength and the duration.

To be tested for COVID-19, a user has to contact a health care practitioner who will take a sample. Either the health care practitioner of the user her/himself will register a pseudonymous identifier from the user’s phone in the testing server. From then on, the Contact Tracing App will regularly check the testing server, by means of this anonymous identifier, to see whether the test result is available. Once the test result is available, the Contact Tracing App will inform the user about the test result: negative or positive. If the result is positive, the user should contact the health practitioner. The user can then decide to upload the Secret Keys to generate the random IDs previously broadcasted (as further described in section 4) to the central server. In order to minimize incorrect use, this upload will be authorized by the testing server that sends an authorization code to the central server. Subsequently, immediately after the upload, all these Secret Keys are removed from the phone.

Except if they are uploaded, the Secret Keys to generate the broadcasted random IDs remain on the phone for a period of maximum 14 days. The recorded random IDs of other users never leave the phone and are destroyed after 14 days.

Once the Secret Keys to generate the broadcasted random IDs are uploaded by an infected user to the central server, the Contact Tracing App of other users can retrieve these Secret Keys from the server to assess whether such other users were exposed to the virus through close-range proximity to a COVID-19 positive person who has uploaded its data. If the Contact Tracing App retrieving the data from the server detects a substantial risk for infection (i.e. the user has been near a COVID-19 positive person during a period of at least 15 minutes), it will inform the user of the Contract Tracing App and recommend certain actions by means of a push notification generated by the Contact Tracing App. It is the sole responsibility of the user to follow upon on these recommendations.

For clarity and avoidance of doubt, the Contact Tracing App does NOT:

  • monitor compliance with any government imposed quarantine, confinement or social distancing measures;
  • track COVID-19 positive patients;
  • transmit in real-time information about a high-risk contact with a positive patient;
  • send any information about users without a positive test result; nor
  • identify hotspots or trajectories of COVID-19 positive patients.

Limited processing for statistical purposes

On the basis of the information uploaded to the central server, Sciensano may compile limited aggregated statistics such as counting the number of keys uploaded per day and the number of people using the Contract Tracing App who have tested positive each day. Sciensano will only generate those figures based on previously anonymised data. Sciensano has no access to the names, phone numbers or other “personal data” provided by the users or generated by the use of the Contact Tracing App.

 

4. What personal data are collected and processed when using the contact tracing app?

The DP-3T system is specifically designed to minimise data collection and processing. When using the Contact Tracing App, only data that allow informing the user that s/he might have been exposed to the virus are collected. The Contact Tracing App does not reveal to the user who the potential contagious contact was, or when exactly and where the contact happened.

A detailed description of the collected data is given below. The collected data does not allow identifying individuals directly or indirectly. Sciensano has no access to the names of the users of the Contact Tracing App nor to other personal data allowing identifying them (telephone number, national registry number, IP address etc.). However, it cannot be excluded that, for example, a user who is notified that s/he has been in close contact with an individual tested positive for COVID-19 may identify that individual. Therefore, the data is generally considered personal data, albeit pseudonymised. The keys and random IDs (as further explained below) qualify as health-related data when (i) the Contact Tracing App determines that a person is at risk of infection, (ii) the person records a test, and (iii) the person shares a positive test result.

Secret Key

The DP-3T system is specifically designed to minimise data collection and processing. When using the Contact Tracing App, only data that allow informing the user that s/he might have been exposed to the virus are collected. The Contact Tracing App does not reveal to the user who the potential contagious contact was, or when exactly and where the contact happened.

A detailed description of the collected data is given below. The collected data does not allow identifying individuals directly or indirectly. Sciensano has no access to the names of the users of the Contact Tracing App nor to other personal data allowing identifying them (telephone number, national registry number, IP address etc.). However, it cannot be excluded that, for example, a user who is notified that s/he has been in close contact with an individual tested positive for COVID-19 may identify that individual. Therefore, the data is generally considered personal data, albeit pseudonymised. The keys and random IDs (as further explained below) qualify as health-related data when (i) the Contact Tracing App determines that a person is at risk of infection, (ii) the person records a test, and (iii) the person shares a positive test result.

Ephemeral random Identifiers (IDs)

Phones with the Contact Tracing App installed broadcast random Identifiers, being combinations of ones and zeros, via Bluetooth. These IDs are computed from the Secret Keys. Once broadcasted, these IDs are deleted from the phone.

The phone receives the IDs that are broadcasted by nearby phones and locally stores the received IDs with the following information: received ID, signal strength, duration and date.

These records of the received IDs are stored on the phone and never sent to anyone.

Lab test result data

Users have the possibility to demand the result of their COVID-19 lab test via the app that connects to the test result server.

IP Address

IP addresses of users who download/upload keys are explicitly removed from any logs or storage. In the Belgian architecture a PROXY server takes care of removal of the IP address of the uploader (alternatively the server does it itself and this is to be audited).

Traffic data about the upload

Users who upload their Secret Keys to the central server will do so via the web service together with the date on which the Secret Key was used and the estimated date on which the user became contagious.

The Contact Tracing App does not collect location data. However, the user may indicate him/herself within the Contact Tracing App in which country/ies s/he has been at a certain date for reasons of interoperability with other countries’ contact tracing apps. In this case, the Secret Key will be sent to the country indicated by the user. This means that it is sent to the “European Federation Gateway Service”, and from there on to the backoffice of the app of the country where the key was used (counterpart to Sciensano) and from there on to all app users of that country. The technical and organisational details of this European cooperation are laid down in an EU Commission Decision (Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2020/1023 of 15 July 2020, which is available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec_impl/2020/1023/oj). For more information on the “European Federation Gateway Service”, please visit https://ec.europa.eu/health/ehealth/covid-19_en. For more information on the identity of the joint controller responsible for the contact tracing app per country, please visit https://ec.europa.eu/health/sites/health/files/ehealth/docs/gateway_jointcontrollers_en.pdf.

Only users for which the testing server has sent an authorisation code (after confirmation that the user has been tested positive) to the central server will be able to successfully upload data to the central server.

Authorisation code

When a user is tested COVID-19 positive, the testing server will send an authorisation code to the central server. When a user wants to upload his/her Secret Keys, the central server checks whether it has received an authorization code for this specific user. If the central server has indeed received an authorization code for this specific user, the user will be able to upload the Secret Keys.

Visited countries

The user may choose to indicate within the Contact Tracing App which countries s/he has visited. Besides this, the Contact Tracing App does not collect nor process any other location data.

Personal data of children

Taking into account the fact that the Contact Tracing App is aimed at protecting health and given the guarantees provided to greatly reduce the risks for users of the app (voluntary use, limited and pseudonymised data, reduced data storage time), it has been considered that from the age of 13 a child can consent alone to the installation of the application. Below this age, the consent of the legal representative is required.

 

5. Does the contact tracing app take automated decisions?

The Contact Tracing App does not take any automated decisions with regard to a user within the meaning of article 22 of the General Data Protection Regulation.

 

6. With whom are personal (pseudonymous) data shared?

Upload to the central server

As described in paragraphs 3 and 4 the user may upload data to the central server. This central server is hosted by Sciensano in the European Union.

The central server only stores information of infected users if they decide to upload the Secret Keys to this server.

Distribution to all apps

As described in paragraphs 3 and 4 the keys uploaded to the central server are distributed on a daily basis to all apps. For efficiency reasons, this distribution can take place through a Content Distribution Network, i.e. a replication service that makes sure that everyone receives the same data without overloading the network.

Sharing of personal data with national providers of European databases related to similar contact tracing apps in other countries.

If the user indicates in the Contract Tracing App that s/he has visited another EU country, the Secret Keys may be sent to the central servers of similar contract tracing apps in those EU countries directly or via the EU gateway, i.e. a server that forwards these keys to the other EU servers. A key gets only forwarded to country A if a user indicates she has visited country A.

Sharing of personal data with ICT-providers

By installing the Contact Tracing App, Google and Apple are able to see who installed the Contact Tracing App. However, they ensure that the system does not share the identity of users with them.

 

7. Are personal data transferred to countries outside of the European Union?

Personal data are not transferred to countries outside of the European Union, with the exception of the United Kingdom in the context of the Content Distribution Network. The European Commission has issued an adequacy decision for the United Kingdom. Such a decision means that the level of protection of personal data in the United Kingdom is equivalent to that of the European Union.

 

8. How long are the personal data kept?

The personal data stored on each user’s phone and on the central server are automatically removed after 14 days.

The Contact Tracing App will in any case be deactivated at the date determined by the applicable Belgian law.

 

9. How are the personal data protected?

The developers of the DP-3T system have attached great importance to the protection of personal data. The DP-3T system provides for the following privacy and security protections:

  • The system is designed to comply with state-of-the art cryptographic techniques and measures.
  • All transmission of personal data are protected by encryption and authenticated when necessary.
  • Personal data is mainly stored on the user’s phone and only limited information is sent to the central server if the user decides to send it (decentralized approach).
  • The decentralized approach mitigates the risk of misuse of the personal data by a central authority.

In addition, the central server is protected by appropriate technical and organisational measures including strict access management.

 

10. What Rights do Users have?

Under the conditions provided for in the General Data Protection Regulation, users have the right to access their personal data, request rectification, erasure or restriction of the processing or object to the processing of their personal data (“data subject rights”).

Sciensano will only be able to respond to requests from users where it will be able to link the data processed in the context of the Contact Tracing App to the specific user. To be able to link the data to the user, Sciensano would need to obtain additional data. As the Contact Tracing App is built on technology aiming at protecting the privacy of the users as much as possible, it is not desirable that Sciensano processes additional data merely to identify the user. Pursuant to article 11 GDPR, Sciensano cannot be obliged to process such additional data to identify the user for the sole purpose of complying with the data subject rights under the GDPR. This means that in practice, users will not be able to exercise their data subject rights unless additional information is provided to Sciensano.

Users have the right to lodge a complaint with the Belgian Supervisory Authority (https://www.gegevensbeschermingsautoriteit.be / https://www.autoriteprotectiondonnees.be / https://www.dataprotectionauthority.be).

 

11. Amendments to this Privacy Statement

Sciensano may amend this privacy statement from time to time in which case, Sciensano will inform the user of such change by means of a notification in the Contact Tracing App.

Suggestions for improvements of the privacy statement may always be reported to [email protected].